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3 Habitus: Terrorism and violent dispositions  
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, long-term processes, the pacification of populations and 
accompanying internalisation of social constraints were discussed.  The duration of 
uninterrupted processes of pacification of behaviour, norms and emotions (Bogner 
1992) are instrumental in the extent to which they are deeply engrained within the 
habitus and the degree to which taboos over the use of violence permeate through 
societies.  The greater the numbers of generations that transmit passive norms and 
values to children, the more normative, robust and uncritically internalised they 
become.   And the less likelihood there will be of these people becoming terrorists. 
 
All forms of violence are affected by these processes yet rarely have they been 
completely eradicated.  Emotions such as fear, insecurity, anger, rage and hatred 
remain embedded within social relations and activities and humans retain the 
biological capacity for aggression.  Within societies, this potential is largely curbed 
through learning and internalising techniques of self-restraint.  Thus there is an 
increase in ‘the social constraint towards self-constraint’ (Elias 2000: 365).  However, 
in particular environments emotions can prove more powerful than incomplete 
processes of self-restraint.  Violence in western social spaces is legally restricted to 
sporting occasions and cultural exhibitions yet remains a feature of school, gang and 
nightlife cultures.  In other words, although there has been a substantial shift in the 
extent that violence is acceptable, and the locations where it can be practised, residues 
remain within mainstream societies despite generations of pacification.  Particular 
concentrations of aggression are located within specific habitus.  Conversely, in 
‘failed states’ associated with endemic aggression and chaos such as Somalia, 
violence is deeply embedded within social relations and activities.  Since colonialism, 
chains of interdependence have regularly been interrupted, social and self constraint 
mechanisms have been displaced and previously controlled hostilities and tensions 
have burst loose alongside new forms.  Traumatic periods with shifting alliances, 
resources, power relations and socio-economic opportunities and threats inhibit the 
reformulation of stable habitus in which behaviour can be sufficiently restrained by 
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self and social constraints.  Armed robberies, tribal attacks, kidnapping, murder, 
political assassination and widespread acts of terrorism are commonplace.  People are 
living with greater danger and uncertainty and as a consequence react to events and 
experiences more emotively.  Violence is an accepted form of response to the 
surroundings.1
 
   
Perhaps surprisingly, extensive and widespread levels of violence are not essential for 
terror groups to form.  On the contrary, terror groups emerge in societies which 
appear at first glance to be pacified.  That political aggression does occur suggests 
that beneath the passive façade, residues of violence remain embedded within social 
and individual personality structures. Adopting the concept of habitus, in this chapter 
I examine the extent to which violence is entwined within feelings and behaviours in 
communities and dispositions.  Reasons for the violent past remaining resonate within 
the present are discussed.  The chapter concludes with a brief examination of some of 
the ways through which related ideas, feelings and behaviours are transmitted.  I 
should acknowledge that this is not an exhaustive critical evaluation of the concept. 
Instead my ambitions are more restrained, orientated towards the application of 
habitus to processes within terrorism.   
 
Establishing Habitus 
 
Through the contributions of Bourdieu and Elias habitus has become an influential 
concept within sociological studies that seek to understand conformity and change.  
Prior to their applications Van Krieken (1998) draws attention to the neglect of 
dispositions and habits within sociology.  As with history, habits also seem to have 
been disregarded.  Yet as Jenkins (2002) and van Krieken (1998) detail Durkheim, 
Hegel, Husserl and Weber identified the centrality of habits within traditional and 
modern forms of behaviour.2
 
  Subsequently, habits became subsumed within the 
application of the concept of socialisation while ‘folkways’ largely disappeared from 
sociological syntax during the 1980s.  Through this incorporation, van Krieken argues 
habit as a concept has become immersed within the wider debate over the extent to 
which socialisation is deterministic.  What Weber (1978) described as the ‘inner 
habitus’ has slipped from sociological consciousness.  
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Building upon the previous chapter there is an obvious overlap between history and 
habitus.  If we are to understand the latter today we must possess knowledge about the 
social activities and ideas that have re-formulated over generations and which are 
largely accepted uncritically.  Social memory is narrated by legitimised agents of 
memory and reflective, symbolic practices.  Representations of the past are entwined 
within individual and social habitus and ‘the fortunes of a nation over the centuries 
become sedimented into the habitus of its individuals’ (Elias 1996: 19).  As such 
historical narrative helps to shape contemporary meaning and behaviour.  The past 
lives on within collective memory, albeit subject to transformation, intersecting with 
recent experiences and reflections.  In the examples of Golden Ages conversely 
history is both re-energised and frozen in the present.   
 
By adapting the concept, both Bourdieu and Elias sought to overcome the individual 
and society dichotomy that has bedevilled sociology.  For Elias (1991: 182) ‘The 
social habitus of individuals, forms, as it were, the soil from which grow the personal 
characteristics through which an individual differs from other members of society’. 
Pierre Bourdieu (1977: 189-90) considered habitus to be, 
 
The product of the work of inculcation and appropriation necessary in 
order for those products of collective history (e.g. of language, economy, 
etc.) to succeed in reproducing themselves more or less completely, in the 
form of durable dispositions… each individual system of dispositions may 
be seen as a structural variant of all the other group or class habitus, 
expressing the difference between trajectories and positions inside and 
outside the class. 
 
It is thus both structured and structuring, product and producer of social worlds 
(Crossley 2003). Elias also draws together the inherent interrelationship between 
individual and social and in the process helps to explain individual and social 
commonality and difference.  Social habitus refers to learned dispositions that are 
shared by people in a group, community or society.  Individual habitus describes a 
person’s learned and particular emotional and behavioural dispositions.   
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Following on from these points, I am arguing that studying historical processes will 
enable greater insight into the experiences of social life as they are lived today.  
Habitus is not however a rooted, immutable point in human development.  Just as 
individual personalities will change over time, as people learn from others, mature, 
have different experiences and exposure to transforming agents and conditions, social 
habitus shifts.  Personality structures change in accordance with the nature of the 
contexts and transitory human activities and interactions.  Individual and social norms, 
values and habits continue to re-formulate within modern societies meaning that 
individual and social habitus are located at particular periods of history and represent 
personality structures of a particular social figuration.  Crucially though, the complex 
nature of increasingly convoluted social processes and activities mean that the 
outcomes of actions and policies will have unintended consequences; the more people 
who are affected the more difficult the outcomes are to control.  This creates problems 
for individual and social personality structures, namely what happens when the 
dynamic of social processes is rapidly transformed and the habitus is lagging behind?  
Does the habitus shift to accommodate the changes or do people seek to protect their 
identities and/or resist or challenge the broader processes.  Elias (1991: 211) describes 
this as a ‘drag effect’ and argues that responses to the unplanned development 
processes will depend, 
 
on the relative strength of the social shift and deep-rootedness and 
therefore the resistance of the social habitus whether – and how quickly 
– the dynamic of the unplanned social process brings about a more or 
less radical restructuring of this habitus, or whether the social habitus of 
individuals successfully opposes the social dynamic, either by slowing it 
down or blocking it entirely. … One has the impression that the solidity, 
the resistance, the deep-rootedness of the social habitus of individuals in 
a survival unit is greater the longer and more continuous the chain of 
generations within which a certain habitus has been transmitted from 
parents to children.  
 
To some extent, the remainder of the chapter, and part of the following chapter, 
explore restraints within different habitus and shifts according to intersections with 
social, cultural, economic and political developments.  Social habitus is more closely 
 74 
examined here and developed through an exploration of individual shifts within 
processes of radicalisation in the next chapter.  
 
Within the contributions of Bourdieu and Elias there are considerable similarities, 
including the emphasis upon learned dispositions and the acknowledgment that ‘the 
habitus, is a product of history’ (Jenkins 2002: 80).  Inevitably there are also 
differences and aspects of underdevelopment.  I have tended to be more sympathetic 
to Elias’ application because of its fluidity and greater emphasis upon historical 
continuities and legacies of earlier forms of conflict.3
 
  In this chapter I seek to draw 
together historical and contemporary forms of habitus that are instrumental within the 
formation of terrorism.   
Violence and restraints within habitus 
 
Across nation-states there have been noticeable shifts in levels of restraints as 
governments have become more powerful.  And if nation-states are to be defined at 
least in part by the protection and control they provide, then as Weber (1978) 
identified a monopoly of the means of violence within a designated territory is 
essential.   Providing leaders have sufficient power, this can initially be achieved 
against the wishes of the population.  If however the regime is looking at legitimacy 
and longevity, its prospects would be enhanced if the social habitus incorporated 
norms and values that contributed to a shift away from public violence and the need 
for socially imposed constraints.  Instead of excessive and costly displays of military 
threat that insist upon obedience, individuals internalise constraints over generations.  
And with the demise of religious institutions, covert and overt responsibility is shared 
across a multitude of agencies including legal systems, public education, government 
departments, the mass media and cultural industries.   Prohibitive threats are only 
effective when they are in place and the personnel, armaments and accompanying 
bureaucracy are expensive.  By comparison, when lengthening chains of mutual 
interdependence are in place and sufficient restraints have been internalised, the state 
can more confidently reduce levels of physical security.  Nevertheless, no state can be 
completely confident in the balance of self and social restraints.  Both are vulnerable 
to fluctuation according to events and experiences and the durability of passive social 
relations and activities.  For instance, as Bourdieu (2000) discussed with regards to 
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rising levels of protest in France, some assumptions and habits that are embedded 
within everyday life can quickly become out of step during moments of crisis and are 
replaced by more critical forms of social agency.4
 
  And as Crossley (2003: 49) 
comments in his critical application of Bourdieu to social movements, considerable 
emphasis is placed upon the emergence of ‘protest repertoires’ during times of crises.  
‘Protest behaviour tends to draw upon a stock of historically and culturally variable 
“techniques” of protest which agents learn: for example, petitioning, marching, 
occupation, tunnelling and bombmaking’.  Thus, as Elias outlined above, there is a 
process of adjustment during and following interactions between habitus and the 
social environment and accompanying threats, opportunities, freedoms and controls.   
Violence can therefore be part of protest repertoires particularly during crises.  
Clearly the stock of techniques to be learnt is crucial to the evolution of terrorism.  
Attention must also be placed upon the synchronic attitudes towards, and practices of, 
continuing acts of violence within mainstream society.  Areas that are associated with 
Islamic terrorism today have long been associated with violence.  At an international 
level, Saudi Arabia is one of the most prominent nation-states within perceptions of 
terrorism.  Out of the 19 bombers in the attacks upon America, 15 were Saudis.  
Furthermore, Niblock (2006) reports that in 2004, 25 per cent of Guantanamo Bay 
detainees were Saudis and 10,000 of its citizens were estimated to have been recruited 
into al-Qa’ida forces in Afghanistan, 2001.5 Within Saudi Arabia there have been 
regular bursts of political violence, including terror attacks, throughout the first 
decade of the twenty first century.  The immediate forerunners of the late 1990s and 
2000s militants were the Wahhabis who seized the Great Mosque in 1979.  Their 
historical lineage can be located with the Ikhwan who had fought since 1912 for the 
formation of the Saudi state.  The Ikhwan committed thousands of violent killings and 
mutilations (Allen 2006) until they were defeated by forces loyal to Ibn Saud after 
challenging his authority. The 1979 militants shared the same Nadji heartland as the 
Ikhwan.  Moreover, the association of the region with violence long predates 
contemporary fears over al-Qa’ida.  For instance, in 1863, William Gifford Palgrave 
when travelling through the region declared it to be ‘the genuine Wahhabee country 
… the stronghold of fanatics, who consider everyone save themselves an infidel or a 
heretic, and who regard the slaughter of an infidel or a heretic as a duty, at least a 
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merit…’.6
 
  This may at first glance seem to connect into Weber’s (1966) argument 
that warriors seeking to conquer the world were the ‘primary carrier’ of Islam.   
Violence within Islam was, for Weber, embedded within the religious discourse as 
evidenced by the use of force by Muhammed and his successors.  Today’s application 
of jihad could be considered to be an inevitable component stemming from the 
discursive foundations, part of an aggressive continuum.  For the purposes of this 
chapter, this is problematic at three levels.  First, Turner (1993) points out that 
Weber’s characterisation of Islam grossly overlooks the vicissitudes within Islam, 
historical transformations and instrumental roles of diplomacy, trade, commerce and 
conversion within the dynamics of expansion.  Second, today as in the eighth century, 
the overwhelming majority of Muslims do not engage in political violence.  Third, 
Islam becomes both discourse and causal factor for violence and the social processes 
that contribute to aggressive behaviour are neglected or oversimplified (Sutton and 
Vertigans 2005).  Nevertheless, despite these inaccuracies, the warrior tradition 
continues to permeate both within Western fears and militant reinterpretations.  For 
example, members associated with al-Qa’ida exemplify this when describing 
themselves as ‘holy warriors.’  Hence the contemporary militant memory contains the 
narrative of the warrior tradition.   
 
Violent pasts are, of course, hardly unusual.  Aggressive struggles over discourse, 
resources and power feature throughout history and across societies.  Yet terrorism is 
not a feature of all societies that have encountered a violent past.  Therefore I am not 
arguing that an aggressive heritage inevitably results in subsequent terror.  My central 
argument here is that ongoing and recent terrorism emerges out of environments 
where the pacification of behaviour, norms and emotions has been interrupted, partial 
or lacks longevity.  In other words processes of pacification are not robust and 
normative, uncritically internalised over generations.  Numerous illustrative examples 
can be found within South America where terrorism has been, and continues to be, 
prominent.   
 
The history of violence and civil wars in Colombia Waldmann (2007:594) suggests 
extends 150 years: ‘almost every aspect of life has been shaped and marked by these 
forms of violence in one way or another’.  Without a secure nationwide monopoly of 
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violence and with ineffective law, Colombia’s system of order is based upon fluid, 
unstable coalitions of civilian, criminal and government agencies.  For Pécaut 
(discussed in Waldmann) violence and coercion are fixed components within social 
and political systems and the pursuit of aims.  With limited restrictions upon the use 
of violence, aggressive behaviour becomes normative.  Waldmann (2007: 596) argues 
that in Colombia this has resulted in escalations into ‘orgies of violence’ within ‘a cult 
of annihilation of enemies.’  Other factors to consider within this culture of violence, 
include the rigid demarcations between friend and foe, a celebration of machismo of 
which violence is an integral component and fatalism within a ‘live for today’ 
approach to life.   
 
In Peru Poole and Rénique (2003) identify the continued presence of violence within 
employment and economic practices, state abuses and opposition tactics. The 
terrorism of the 1980s and 1990s extended the usage of violence both in terms of 
targets, in particular civilians, and the nature of attacks which included torture, rape 
and executions as military and paramilitary ‘death caravans’ toured competitively 
through rural areas.  The Peruvian Communist Party – Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL) 
or Shining Path, were heavily involved within the spiralling political violence.  The 
adoption of terror tactics by the Far Left was not unusual.  Groups had undertaken 
economic sabotage and military engagement with government forces.  The 1980s 
marked a shift in tactics as the Shining Path built upon the perceived failures of lesser 
forms of violence and extended targets to include all those who did not support the 
group.  Spiralling violence was marked even by the standards of preceding 
generations7
 
 to such an extent that it was described as the ‘manchay tiempo’ or time 
of fear (ibid.).  In essence the previous forms of violence informed the group habitus 
about its essentiality and became the benchmark by which to measure the likely 
effectiveness of actions.  Thus, revolutionary violence was considered to be the only 
mechanism that could defeat state sponsored violence.  With this hypothesis, the 
nature and breadth of terror that is unleashed becomes an integral measure towards 
revolution.  Reform programmes that reallocated land, created massive agricultural 
co-operatives, fuelled massive migration to urban areas and, 
hastened the breakdown of Andean society  ….  When, after 1975, the 
military government went into a crisis … the great associative enterprises 
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were left like semi-abandoned and demoralized garrisons, scattered in the 
power vacuum left by the state’s retreat from the countryside (Degregori 
(1997: 40). 
 
The demise of the old oligarchical order, a previous history of authoritarianism and 
failure of the government to embed regional and national democratic reforms in the 
late 1970s meant that the appeal of totalitarianism rose as a solution to the disorder 
and decay.  When developed within the culture of violence, the nature of the 
discursive consciousness and conviction lead to a further diminution of social and 
individual restraints.  The spiralling effect within these habitus is particularly striking.  
Moss (1997) compares the level of violence within Peru (25,000 deaths) and Sri 
Lanka (between 70,000 and 90,000) with Italy, around 400 murders. Clearly the 
amount of killings is heavily influenced by regimes’ tactics and the number of 
insurgents capable of political violence.  In Peru there were around 25,000 insurgents 
compared with a few hundred Italians involved in clandestine violence.  Yet the 
figures fail to explain why violence became so brutally endemic in Peru.  In part this 
can be considered to be a consequence of the correlation between the numbers of 
insurgents and levels of fear.  Simplistically the number of insurgents is reflected in 
the level of fear amongst the population and government forces contributing to a 
higher density of violence. In turn this contributes to spiralling levels of uncertainty, 
insecurity and hatred, which further weaken social restraints against the use of 
violence. This may partly explain why widespread civil conflicts generate greater 
number of deaths and atrocities than many other locations experiencing more clearly 
demarcated forms of terrorism.   
 
Across other regions numerous other more explicitly terror groups have emerged 
following the demise of norms and values based around family, community customs 
and religion and prior to the internalisation of a new comprehensive system within 
individual and social habitus.  Italy is a very good example with the situation 
compounded by malfunctioning political systems, weak national consciousness and 
migration from southern regions to the north and from rural to urban areas (Pisano 
1979, Vinci 1979).  The shifting populations placed unbearable burdens upon social 
services within the popular locations while simultaneously the dispositions of 
significant numbers of people were lagging behind the social and economic 
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transformations they were experiencing.  Moreover, existing discursive frameworks 
were in crisis through association with Mussolini’s fascism, post Second World War 
political stagnation, instability, corruption and the gradual weakening of 
Catholicism’s hold upon morality.  In these circumstances, groups that offered 
explanations and solutions found appeal (Jamieson 1989, Lumley 1990, Silj 1979, 
Tarrow 1989, Weinberg 1986).  
 
State and civil spillover 
 
The centrality of the state in the monopoly of violence and shifting restraints has 
already been established.  Despite the gradual transformation towards pacification, 
episodes of terrorism indicate that processes are incomplete.  In some locations it is 
possible to argue that nation-states’ approaches to violence are contributing to 
aggression becoming, or remaining, integral within some layers of habitus.  Spillover 
theory suggests that there is a relationship between the extent that a state legitimises 
violence in certain situations and more illegitimate forms of violence such as armed 
robbery and murder.  Although the state only permits violence within demarcated 
spheres the accompanying values and justification ‘spillover’ into other social 
contexts.  Thus to declare that people in favour of the death penalty will be less 
constrained to support other forms of violence would be a reasonable supposition.  
Equally in societies where capital punishment is public, members of the civilian 
population are likely to have a different perspective towards the application of 
violence.  Thus in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim systems of jurisprudence which 
implement a literal interpretation of Shari’ah law violence is a more integral method 
of punishment.  Chopping off right hands, stoning adulterers and beheading murderers 
in public both reflect and reinforce habitus and the acceptance of violence as a 
solution.8  For Bowers’ (1984) brutalization thesis, the death penalty and, by 
extension, capital punishment desensitise people to killing.  Human life is devalued 
and the policy provides the rationale to attack those who cause offence to the 
individual or collective identification.  The boundaries for spillover become 
particularly blurred when the same concepts are both implicitly supported by 
governments and utilised by the opposition to legitimise acts of political violence.  
Thus the interwoven teaching of jihad as a form of attack and sacrifice/martyrdom 
permeates through Muslim societies alongside the emphasis upon submission to 
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religious leaders.  The repetitive and widespread acceptance of the literal necessity 
and compatibility between both applications has become part of absolutist narrative 
and the benchmark for behaviour within political circles and beyond.  Compromise 
and achieving the potentially contradictory standards becomes increasingly difficult.  
As a consequence, government discourse is often challenged against criteria they 
helped to formulate for its un-Islamic nature.    
 
Within the West, the United States provides an excellent example of the prevalence of 
violence and associated ambiguities within even the most modern of nations.9  
Mennell (2007: 1) illuminates this when observing how ‘the laws and customs only 
weakly restrain people from doing harm to themselves and others by the use of guns, 
and the murder rate is about four times as high per capita as in Western Europe’.  The 
widespread availability of guns is allied to the integral symbolism of weapons within 
We-images of (white10) America.  In essence the gun is symbolic within lifestyles of 
large segments of American society and arouses heightened emotions within the pro 
and anti lobbies (Crothers 2002, Karl 1995, Levitas 2002).   The coinciding huge 
surges both in gun ownership in the mid nineteenth century and homicide rates would 
seem to endorse a possible connection.  Alongside the individual’s right to bear arms, 
formal levels of pacification are further challenged by state sponsored violence.  The 
death penalty continues to be carried out within particular states.  These states were 
part of the confederacy that fought to retain slavery in the American civil war and 
included regions where, rarely punished, lynching of blacks continued well into the 
twentieth century.  In these locations, honour between whites continued to be 
emphasised before and after the civil war.  Quarrels were often resolved according to 
informal codes and violent responses to particular provocations were considered 
appropriate.11  White dominance over blacks was normalised throughout slavery and 
beyond.  Power was asserted within daily life in the nature of social interactions and 
physical, social and psychological demarcations between white and black zones.  
Violence against blacks was a prominent mechanism both in reinforcing perceptions 
of white dominance and imposing social restraint upon blacks.  Aggressive attacks 
like these were largely ignored by law enforcement agencies.12  In comparison with 
this neglect, today there is considerable public support13 for the application of the 
death penalty.  However, this apparent contradiction reflects a shift within those same 
states from popular support for ‘extra judicial’ murder of overwhelmingly black males 
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to state sponsored killing of black males who are significantly over represented 
amongst those who are executed (Zimring 2003).   Arguably the continuation of these 
policies has meant that ritualised violence has remained embedded within largely 
right-wing layers of dispositions which Mennell (2007) notes is more strongly 
represented in America than in most other Western nation-states.   
 
Alongside the incorporation of violence within national habitus, governments also 
contribute to the interweaving of aggression, ideas and feelings. This has been 
particularly noticeable within many Muslim nation-states as governments have either 
utilised anti-American sentiments to generate support or sought to overcome the 
perceptions of themselves as USA stooges.  Thus governments that are considered 
Western allies such as Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have publicly or complicitly 
encouraged anti-Western rhetoric.  Abdallah (2006: 46) draws upon the ‘paradox of 
Mubarak’s regime … [in] an era in which Egyptian-American relations were 
consolidated at economic and military levels although political discourse and media 
exposure were more anti-American.’  Arguably such sentiments are even more 
pronounced in Saudi Arabia where distinctions within Wahhabism between ‘loyalty 
and disassociation’ encourage distance from infidels (Hegghammer 2009).  
Demarcations are further reinforced through perceptions of superiority and lack of 
social contact with non Muslims which tend to result in portrayals of Westerners 
being somewhat crude and stereotypical.  That terrorism by Saudi nationals has been 
directed more towards Western targets than the regime is perhaps not surprising in 
light of this.14
 
  The fundamental problem with this political manoeuvring is therefore 
that it contributes to the further normalisation of aggression within the national 
habitus.   
National symbolism also features within sedimented feelings towards violence.  
Symbols of destruction and aggression are noticeable throughout many leading 
nation-states with military apparatus integral to the dominance.  Power has been 
secured regularly through political violence or military coups across South America, 
Asia and Africa.  Furthermore, major conflicts continue to threaten or engulf regions 
in places such as Indonesia, Algeria, Philippines, Rwanda, Chechnya and the Middle 
East.  There are two particular examples of militarism that in part reflect regional 
uncertainties that I wish to draw upon.  Over recent years Pakistan and Saudi Arabia 
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have invested heavily in armaments.  Both have experienced substantial episodes of 
terrorism within their nation-states.  I am not arguing that there is a ludicrously simple 
causal relationship here.  The amount of money spent on tanks does not correlate to 
the number and magnitude of terror attacks.  Nevertheless, this is another facet of the 
respective societies that further reinforces the incorporation of violence within social 
and political relations which contribute to the justification of terrorism within 
particular locations.   
 
Bandura’s (1976: 128) observation provides an apt summary for this section: societies 
with ‘extensive training in aggression and [which] make it an index of manliness or 
personal worth’ spend greater ‘time threatening, fighting, maiming and killing each 
other’ in comparison to ‘cultures where interpersonal aggression is discouraged and 
devalued’.  
 
Community Layers 
 
Contrary to the popular portrayal of the ‘evil’ terrorist who by implication is innately 
wicked, and thus beyond redemption, radical discursive consciousness forms within 
social interaction.  This is not restricted to intergenerational acts of political violence 
but also the ideas and forms of behaviour which are retained within the broader 
habitus.  These social personality structures do not inevitably mean that all people 
who hold the related values become violent generally and terrorists in particular.  The 
following chapter aims to detail how complicated and difficult this process is.  
Nevertheless, the broader communal habitus does contribute to processes of 
radicalism and provides the normative standards for feelings and behaviour.  
Immersion within particular social habitus contributes to the internalisation of 
particular beliefs and values and adaptation of forms of behaviour.  Arguably this 
habitus is instrumental in determining the likelihood that individuals will be exposed 
to, and internalise, radical discourses and the legitimising experiences.   
 
Nationalist communities are the most obvious example of this. In some instances 
these are not widely dissimilar from radical ideas within the habitus of terrorists.  
Such pathways into terrorism often commence with the complimentary discursive 
consciousness that is acquired within, and shared with, communities.  For instance, as 
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I discussed above, the code of honour and racial supremacy continues to be 
sedimented within American regionalised characteristics.   When this is intersected by 
the acceptance of armed civilians, complicit allowance of militias and vigilantes and 
‘ethic of self-help’ (Spierenburg 2006: 110), there is a fundamental shift to racially 
inspired political violence ‘in defence’ of white rights.  However, these factors will 
only become instrumental if processes of pacification and individual restraints are not 
well embedded. In America, as Mennell (2007) explains, the higher incidence of 
affective homicides when compared to West European nations, indicates that ‘“the 
muting of the drives” (Elias 2000) has been less effective than in equivalent parts of 
Europe.’ Obviously easier access to guns is also a factor and arguably is indicative of 
the different approaches and levels of control.  Conversely, when restraints are 
imposed such as New York’s drive to reduce gun crime, they can be effective.  
Nevertheless, the extent to which emphasis can shift over the longer term from 
government to individual controls will depend heavily upon the restraints becoming 
sufficiently embedded and robust within individual and social dispositions.  As I 
explained earlier this requires security and trust which cannot be formulated and 
deeply embedded over the short term.  Challenges over the monopoly of violence 
allied to the insecurities, threats and fears that were prevalent within slavery and 
subsequent racial structural arrangements inhibited the shift towards self-restraint.  
Today heightened fears over employment, immigration and insecurities stemming 
from crime and terrorism have connected into the history of self-defence and militias.  
‘Citizen volunteers’ such as the Minutemen, many of whom are armed and supported 
by white supremacist groups, in Arizona have worked alongside border patrols in 
seeking to stem illegal entry.  And because of the blurred boundaries between 
volunteer and extremist groups, the incorporation of the Minutemen provides formal 
legitimacy to the racial underpinning for the immigration patrols that extends into 
radical ideas within habitus.     
 
Within communities that are demarcated according to nationality, ethnicity or religion, 
interaction across the boundaries is usually restricted and the limited social 
interactions contribute to the foundation of stereotypes which become embedded both 
within ‘We’ identification and stigmatisation of the other, following what Fanon 
(2007: 81) described as the Aristotelian logic of the ‘principle of reciprocal 
exclusivity’.  Collective memories abound with narrative and images that are 
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associated with particular spaces and contribute to the demarcation.  Agents of 
memory create and re-create representations with place, time and peoples. The 
Palestinian territories and Northern Ireland provide illuminating examples with 
divisions accepted, encouraged and contributing towards collective forms of 
identification and detachment.  For instance, in 1968 just prior to the ‘Troubles’, two 
thirds of all families lived in the streets of Belfast, Northern Ireland, where 91 per 
cent of households belonged to the same religion (Arthur 1997). Urban interfaces are 
strategically marked with opposing flags, emblems, murals and graffiti to reinforce 
collective memories and consciousness.  Historical images are utilised to connect with 
the present.  And with the gradual demise of previous generations who had 
participated in the Somme, Easter Rising, war for independence, partition or civil war, 
agents of memories have been essential within the utilisation of historical images in 
the maintenance of common memories.  For loyalists, Jarman (1997) argues, Unionist 
iconography tends to depict the past in terms of blood sacrifice, Catholic duplicity and 
fear of betrayal (by the British).  Sacrifice also features prominently within nationalist 
iconography.  These help to reinforce positive perceptions of the in-group.  By 
comparison, the ‘other’ is an established figure of hatred with accompanying feelings 
and emotions inculcated into individuals from childhood.  Social exchanges between 
the opposing groups are restricted to verbal and physical forms of violence.  Symbols 
become integral in reinforcing negative emotions about the other and with limited 
interaction, there is little opportunity to offset the stereotypes with contradictory 
experiences.  Thus, after over ten years of peace in Northern Ireland physical and 
psychological divisions remain between the respective We groups and the possibility 
of more widespread forms of reciprocal political violence remains.   
 
Alongside physical barriers, social and cultural boundaries have reformulated 
distinctions with habitus.  For instance, the Gaelic challenge to Anglicization within 
Ireland towards the end of the nineteenth century reenergised the Irish language, 
poems, songs, legends, folk tales and clothes (Foster 1989).  In this regard there was a 
reconnection with the traditional interconnection between literature and politics that 
has often been described as a ‘bloody crossroads’ (Kiberd 1992).  Folk songs and 
music could be added to the catalogue.  Although initially cultural, Gaelicization was 
to raise awareness, confidence and assertiveness in a sense of being Irish and related 
achievements that were to feed into and become interwoven with the republican 
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movement.  Michael Collins, the IRA leader, declared that ‘We only succeeded after 
we had begun to get back to our Irish ways’.15
 
   
As I discussed in the preceding chapter, previous violent experiences as both 
aggressor and victim can remain integral to the contemporary. The involvement of 
females (and males) within Chechen militant groups was heavily influenced by ‘a 
mass societal trauma that still lives on in group consciousness’ (Speckhard 2008: 
1027).  Recent actions by the Russian government are viewed through a continuum 
that incorporates confrontations between Chechens and infidel Russians since the 
eighteenth century.  Mobilising history includes episodes under the rubric of jihad and 
mass deportation during Stalin’s regime (Johnston 2008).  When these actions are 
considered within a habitus that incorporates a duty to revenge, less constraints and 
greater liberation of women, as discussed in the previous chapter, feelings can 
transcend into behaviour which in Chechnya has meant women becoming terrorists 
and attacking Russian targets.  However as the preceding chapter also indicated, 
women can become terrorists within environments that could, with some justification, 
be classified as patriarchal.  In the Palestinian territories, there has been a shift in 
restraints as females were, initially begrudgingly, allowed to participate within terror 
attacks.  Again if we examine forms of female behaviour that preceded the attacks, 
females of all ages were centrally located within the first intifada.  Prior to that, 
women were involved within the secular precursors of today’s more religious terror 
groups.  Leila Khaled is the most notable example.  Consequently, although there has 
been a subsequent shift in gender balance towards further male dominance, the legacy 
of greater female participation remains within the habitus.  Compared to other Arab 
societies and while acknowledging that the society remain male-dominated, Copeland 
(2002: C1) argues ‘Palestinian women have been the most liberated’.  Similarly 
women continue to acquire higher education and pursue professional careers.  For 
instance, Speckhard (2008) details the achievements and experiences of a couple of 
female suicide bombers which challenge the popular perception represented by Victor 
(2004) and the centrality of employment, educational and social restrictions to 
motivations.  Speckhard and Ahkmedova (2006) also challenge the tendency to 
categorise Muslim suicide bombers, noticing that support for such attacks16 and the 
‘cult of martyrdom’ are much less noticeable within Chechnya than in the Palestinian 
territories.   
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In the studies that draw upon gender involvement, the numerous similarities between 
the sexes in terms of experience and motivations were overlooked.  And this is 
symptomatic of most studies of gender which Fausto-Sterling (2000) argues continue 
to search for difference and not similarities.  In terms of habitus, girls also attend 
kindergartens and school where they are exposed to a curriculum laden with 
declarations of Palestinian heroism, sacrifice, Israeli brutalities and the religious 
obligation to fight for Palestine (Burdman 2003, Oliver and Steinberg 2005).  
 
By comparison, if the emotions within the group are more detached from the 
community, they will be more isolated.  Shared historical memories and commonality 
of feelings between nationalist groups like IRA, ETA, HAMAS, Islamic Jihad and 
Chechen militants communities were arguably factors behind their considerably 
greater levels of support compared to ideological groups such as Red Army Faction, 
Red Brigades and Japanese Red Army which failed to connect across their respective 
societies.  And within these cultures of opposition or resistance (Foran 1997), there 
can be resources, traditions and symbols that stimulate feelings of endurance, 
determination and sacrifice in circumstances in which victory is by no means 
guaranteed.  Instead, groups may adopt a long term strategy to which members 
contribute.  These individuals may never witness the achievement of their goals and 
may never expect to.  Yet their contributions to the possibility of an eventual victory 
provide sufficient satisfaction.   Nevertheless these commonalities cannot be assumed 
to invariably provide the basis for nationalist support.  Wieviorka (1997) details how 
this is contingent upon militants and populations sharing the same aspirations and, I 
would add, fears.  Basque nationalism was seriously eroded by democracy alongside 
stability and prosperity: conditions which undermined the broader demands for 
independence while contributing to the acceleration of terrorism.  Subsequent 
attempts by trans-national groups such as those associated with al-Qa’ida have also 
failed to recruit in massive numbers (Vertigans 2009).  Arguably this is in part 
because the internalised historical memories and collective forms of national 
identification of potential supporters provide a defence against the emotive appeal of 
radicalism.  There is a bounded restraint that is hard for alternative emotions to 
penetrate.  Certainly people are angered by Western policy, outraged by Israeli 
incursions and morally repulsed by the deaths of women and children.  Nevertheless, 
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the social constraints they have internalised and collective loyalties prevent these 
emotions from becoming triggers into terrorism.  Within national settings such as 
Chechnya, Northern Ireland, the Palestinian territories and Sri Lanka the emotions 
were more inclusive and representative of the communities.  By comparison the 
feelings of the ideological and trans-national groups were more exclusive, not 
engaging with non participant’s experiences.   
 
Further important distinctions can be located within demarcated public spaces in 
localities such as Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Palestinian territories, Kashmir, 
Philippines and Chechnya, large numbers of the respective populations share opinions 
about the nature of the problems (inequality, repression, poverty) they encounter, the 
cause (governing nation) and solution (independence).  They also tend to share a 
reconstitution of history with narrative that affirms ethnic unity, heroism, cultural and 
political demarcations.  This has enabled associated terrorists to largely be embedded 
within the communities.  Emotions, discourse and strategic goals continued to be 
shared with family, friends and neighbours although not necessarily the adoption of 
violence.  Within these localities conflicting beliefs become normative.  They became 
sustained and reinforced by contemporary experiences, common history and discourse 
that groups such as the IRA, HAMAS, UVF and Tamil Tigers (LTTE) have been able 
to utilise in order to recruit members and retain wider support.  In her study of 
political violence in Italy, della Porta (1995) identified the importance of police 
brutality, state authoritarianism and indiscriminate attacks against demonstrators and 
activists.  These events and experiences contributed to an atmosphere in which 
violence was considered to be an appropriate, indeed the only, appropriate response to 
violence.  Within these dynamics, spirals of hatred accelerate as state and non state 
actors become embedded within reciprocal forms of violence.  If groups and 
surrounding ‘civilians’ continue to share sufficient emotions and experiences within 
these settings and the former are widely considered to be acting in support of the latter 
then the extent of detachment is restricted.  This is not to say there is none; the 
clandestine nature of terrorism means that even within supportive communities, those 
participating within actions are unable to share their experiences and feelings with 
non members.  By comparison, with the exception of the above Italian example, 
groups such as the ‘red’ groups of the 1970s and 1980s did not share dispositions with 
most of their societies and the emotional distance between them was greater.   
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Broader Movement 
 
Forms of discursive consciousness feed into norms, behaviour and emotions, 
providing frameworks of explanation both for problems faced and solutions.  The 
more successful groups tend to be part of a broader ideological movement with which 
they share a number of norms and values and which are explored in greater depth in 
the following chapter.  Thus terror groups have formed at the extreme of numerous 
nationalist, Marxist and religious movements and multiple locations including South 
America, the Middle East, Western Africa, South and Southeast Asia.  With regards 
to religiously inspired terror groups, Ranstorp (2003: 124) notes that ‘Almost all the 
contemporary terrorist groups with a religious imperative are either offshoots or on 
the fringe of broader movements’.  Today, it is possible to notice a shifting and 
blurring between ideological demarcations.  Hybrids are forming between the 
discourses as singular forms become discredited by failure or pragmatism.  Thus 
religion and nationalism is interwoven within diverse groups such as the Christian Far 
Right in America, Hindu Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, HAMAS and Islamic Jihad in the 
Palestinian territories, International Sikh Youth Federation in India while Marxism 
and nationalism can still be located within South American terror and guerrilla groups.   
 
The foundations of pathways into terrorism very often occur within the community or 
nation.  For instance, although groups such as The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm 
of the Lord and The Order were to some extent physically and psychologically 
detached from mainstream America, there was considerable overlap between their 
discourse and those of the dominant political hegemony of the period.  As Hamm 
(2007) outlines, during the early 1980s the Christian Right was in the ascendancy and 
became interwoven within patriotism and conservatism.  In this regard, the new 
movement should be considered as part of the legacy of Puritanism which is rooted 
within American conservatism, providing the moral framework with which to 
establish boundaries between good and evil.  Populist campaigns that concentrated 
upon immigration, scarce public services and crime were implicitly underpinned with 
racial and migrant connotations.  Through these relationships, the national religious 
curriculum within schools shifted in content, the traditional family was promoted as 
the cornerstone of American life.  By comparison, matters such as abortion,17 
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pornography and homosexuality were widely denounced as immoral, the fallout from 
the 1960s permissiveness and counterculture.  Radical groups ‘were marching in 
lockstep with the Reagan-era zeitgeist’ (Hamm 2007: 97).18
 
  These issues were 
happening alongside the ‘great transformation of American society with regard to 
matters of race’ (Omi and Winant 1994: 94) as white supremacy has been challenged 
from the early 1950s and ultimately replaced by the concept of ‘racial equality.’  
Within the transformation, barriers to political and social participation were formally 
removed, much to the consternation of the white racialists.  For them, as for other 
members in positions of perceived dominance, the changing nature of the relationship 
became a challenge to their super-ordination and the basis for their identified 
superiority.  This is because, 
Even under the most favourable circumstances … a chain of several 
generations is usually needed in the life of a people for completion of the 
transformation of personality structures which facilitates the secure 
functioning of a multi-party parliamentary regime’ (Elias 1996: 294).   
 
Moreover earlier adoptions of violent behaviour can then become the best predictor of 
subsequent behaviour.  Post et al. (2002) outline the predisposition within groups to 
become involved in violent campaigns when leaders and/or members have previous 
experience.  The recruitment strategy of the Real IRA which targeted disaffected 
members of the Provisional IRA is indicative of this.  Arguably this can also apply 
when other discursive groups have practised political violence during a preceding 
period as outlined in the previous chapter.   
 
Groups not connected to broader social movements have tended to be, as Hewitt 
(2003: 61) remarks, ‘small, short-lived and responsible for only a handful of 
incidents’.  Within Europe it is illustrative to further compare the intensity and extent 
of ‘red’ terrorism in Italy and West Germany.  In the previous chapter, I outlined 
historical reasons why terrorism was more extensive in Italy.  There were also 
contemporary issues with which they interacted.  Both countries experienced unrest.  
In Germany this was largely restricted to the student and counter culture movement.  
By comparison, the wave of unrest that spread within Italy during the late 1960s 
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incorporated both students and workers within uprisings, protests and strikes (Pisano 
1979).   
 
Threats to the habitus and solutions within 
 
Within ideologies such as those associated with militant religious groups, the far right 
in the United States and, to a lesser extent, loyalists in Northern Ireland and pro 
government groups and death squads in Central America such as Mano Blanco (White 
Hand) in Guatemala, principles, beliefs and standards are embedded that stem from 
the past.  To varying degrees, these are ideals that are rooted in perceptions of 
greatness, a ‘Golden Age’ when the discourse was implemented in its pure essence 
accompanied by actions of heroism and devotion that continue to be the source of 
pride within contemporary forms of identification.  Long lasting fragments from 
previous forms of social habitus usually incorporating symbols and customs prove 
durable within modern dispositions.  That these are socially constructed and the 
accuracy of the synchronic narrative questionable has become irrelevant with the 
passage of time.  ‘All traditions are created … through shared practice, and they can 
be profoundly and consciously modified and manipulated under the guise of a more 
legitimate earlier practice’ (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996).   
 
Ahmed (2004) and Akbar (2002) outline how the origins of Pakistan have proved 
instrumental in subsequent fears over challenges to (Sunni) Islam from neighbours, 
other religions and Islamic denominations, most notably Shi’a.19  For instance, 
experiences under British colonialism, the gruesome massacres committed during 
partition of India, impressions of Islam being under threat, the usage of Islam as the 
one unifying form of consciousness and subsequent politicization and incorporation of 
Islam by governing regimes, most notably during the leadership of General Zia ul 
Haq20 have all become interwoven within national and trans-national habitus.  Akbar 
(2002) suggests that Zia’s policies led to Islam being radicalised with contours 
reformulated.  Hitherto, Christians had largely avoided the outbursts of violence.  
Now they became incorporated within the revised and extended demarcation lines 
between the Sunni Muslim ‘We’ and the remaining groups loosely categorised as the 
‘Other’.  Although they had not been involved with the violence of Partition, the 
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refocused targeting of enemies included the West and merged with the bitter local 
history under colonialism.   
 
Comparing the contemporary mundane with the extraordinary past can contribute to 
wistful longing for tradition and a detachment from the morals and principles of the 
present.  And as Elias (1996) identified with respect to the rise of Nazism in Germany, 
the appeal of idealised aspects of belief rises during times of crises.  Thus Left Wing 
surges of support in South America, shifts in racial laws in the United States and re-
evaluation of political boundaries within Northern Ireland have all been accompanied 
with a competing and challenging We resurgence in symbols and slogans that connect 
to a preceding habitus.  If the struggle over issues such as inequalities, political 
representation and lifestyles becomes sufficiently significant then as Stuart Hall 
(1985: 113) explained with reference to race, ‘social reproduction becomes a 
contested process’.  In these environments, social and political consensus is seriously 
undermined, mutual interdependence and empathy becomes seriously weak.  
Crucially all the above forms of social protest have transcended into terrorism partly, I 
argue, because the perceived shifts in national consciousness left the militants feeling 
like detached outsiders.  Consequently, they were less emotionally attached to the 
nation and its peoples.  Elias has pointed out that greater functional democratisation is 
accompanied by enhanced levels of empathy and the likelihood of inter group 
tensions diminishes.  This does not appear to apply in the above examples.  On the 
contrary, these groups chose to attack when national functional democratisation 
became more substantial.  In essence, greater incorporation of ethnic minorities within 
power relations and economic opportunities is considered to be at their expense.21
 
   
Competitive Habitus 
 
Situations with two competing terror groups provide different dynamics. For instance, 
as Chapter Six outlines, sectarian terror killings were often instrumental within spirals 
of violence in Columbia, Iraq, Italy and Northern Ireland.  A common perception held 
by one ‘side’ is that very often they are an extension of the state on whose behalf 
political violence is committed.  In Northern Ireland, loyalists defended their actions 
as being in accordance with the British government even if the government was not 
necessarily appreciative of their efforts.  Under this reasoning violence can only be 
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justified as part of a defensive, reactive strategy to republican aggression.  When 
loyalist groups appeared as aggressors then they became detached from the role as 
defenders of the community and public support diminished.  By comparison, Hayes 
and McAllister (2005) explain that republican violence was embedded within Irish 
politics to such an extent that it had been enshrined within the Irish republic’s 
constitution which in turn had been heavily influenced by preceding phases of 
violence.  These historical and strategic reasons for the justification of political 
violence were, Hayes and McAllister (2005) argue, instrumental in understanding 
different sectarian attitudes to decommissioning.    
 
Exposure to alternative discourses or lifestyles can also contribute to a strengthening 
of individual and group beliefs.  For instance, the emergence of new religious 
movements and counter cultures during the 1960s in American led to a shift in more 
conservative forms of Christianity that culminated in the 1970s and 1980s surge in the 
New Christian Right’s cultural and political activism (Dawson 2006).  Similarly, 
rising visibility of secessionist and Marxist guerrillas groups have activated pro state 
groups in Northern Ireland, Guatemala and El Salvador while the emergence of fascist 
and pro government groups in Germany, Italy and South America during the 1960s 
and 1970s were strongly linked with the formation of Far Left groups.  By 
comparison, the damaged German national consciousness and collective feelings of 
guilt that were internalised by subsequent generations contributed to a lack of positive 
We-images.  For the children of the Nazi generation this contributed to a restricted 
collective consciousness and certainly a reluctance to express national sentiments.  
Without nationalism to help bind the defeated nation, emphasis was placed upon 
development and consumerism without addressing the void within levels of We-ness.  
Many within the younger generation sought alternative discourses to explain the 
feelings and fears they were experiencing.  In this regard, the decision to reformulate 
extreme left discursive consciousness was unsurprising (Elias 1996).  
 
Across societies it is possible to observe the greater participation of younger adults 
within radical politics.  Within these generations there is often greater willingness to 
undertake social critical analysis of national principles and government practices 
alongside reluctance to compromise.  The waves of student protest across Western 
cities in the late 1960s are indicative of this.22  From these movements in America, 
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Japan, Italy and West Germany people became committed both to non violent direct 
action within social movements and political violence.  For those who became 
engaged in violent action, peaceful protest was considered to have failed and 
terrorism was considered to be the only solution.  The terror (and non violent) leaders 
and members possessed cultural and social capital with which to critically oppose and 
formulate alternative discourses and groupings.  In the West German example, the 
above characteristics of the younger generation are, for Elias (1996), given added 
resonance by the national habitus.  He examines the legacy of the German military 
tradition which was so instrumental in the emergence of Nazism.  What is however 
less immediately apparent is that the sediment of those same values existed within the 
habitus of the Left Wing groups that were so vehemently opposed to the possibility of 
fascism returning.  Thus characteristics such as absolute conviction, determination 
and unwavering loyalty to principles alongside a portrayal of compromise as a 
betrayal of ideals are noticeable across a trajectory that stems from the aristocratic 
militarism of the nineteenth century.   For Elias, strategies of compromise make for 
more difficult navigation for individuals across social landscapes.  Proscription and 
prescription provide clearly demarcated routes.  Navigating through compromise is 
much more complex, with both means and ends open to negotiation that requires 
insights into tact and sensitivities that can only be acquired through exposure.  In this 
regard there was a clear lag between the democratic arrangements adopted by the post 
Second World War West German state and the more rigid absolutism that continued 
to reside within layers of social habitus.   
 
Migrant international habitus 
 
Thus far I have concentrated upon figurations and habitus transforming around clearly 
demarcated areas.  Throughout history, individuals have consciously chosen to change 
their habitus through relocation for social, cultural, economic, political and legal 
reasons.  Elias (1991: 236) describes the demand for a change of social habitus which 
people aim to achieve through migration.  Yet the choice of destination, transition and 
accommodation are all restricted by the pre-migration habitus.  Processes of 
modification and reinterpretation abound during, and after, migration.  Particularly 
pertinent examples can be found both within Pakistan and Pakistani immigrants to the 
UK.  Migration from rural to urban areas or to different countries can contribute to 
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what Roy (2004) refers with respect to Muslims as ‘deterritorialised communities’.  
For migrant Muslims, Roy argues, the process of resettlement or uprooting leads to a 
reassessment of their beliefs and often a subsequent reconstruction of Islamic identity.  
For migrants and subsequent generations caught between cultural norms and values 
from the country of origin and those of the new home country, a process of 
deculturation can be experienced as the ‘pristine ethnic culture’ fades with each 
generation.  Communities become places of shelter from recurrent problems that 
migrants encounter (Elias 1991).  For second and third generations different problems 
arise as they acquire the social habitus of their parents and language, customs and 
morals of the host country.  Personal, generational, ethnic and nationalist tensions 
arise as individuals seek to reconcile values and forms of behaviour that are often 
contradictory.  There are a number of alternatives: 
 
i) Some members of the later generations remain integrated within the 
habitus of their parents. 
ii) People can become detached and shift towards the dominant mainstream 
culture.  However levels of discrimination, racism and defined contours of 
national identity may limit this option.   
iii) And of most interest here, individuals can formulate hybrid responses to 
the situations in which they are located.  For these people, religion and 
ethnicity become sources of shared commonality and solidarity, proving 
feelings of unity, beliefs, rituals and prescriptions amidst displaced 
collective memories and discarded, outmoded forms of behaviour.   
 
Transnational movements, allegiances and explanations can appeal to these people 
through a form of international habitus.  The attraction of global jihad and the al-
Qa’ida franchise should be considered within this broader movement and habitus.  
Both Gunaratna (2003) and Sageman (2004) have identified the disproportionate 
involvement of migrants within major terror attacks since the late twentieth century.  
Again though, it is important to stress that there are historical precedents.  For 
instance, Akbar (2002) notes how, in the late twelfth century, responses to Saladin’s 
call for a jihad against Richard the Lionheart23 came from as far away as India.  Of 
course this was long before the emergence of processes of globalisation that are often 
viewed as inherent within forms of international Islamic militancy.  
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Yet what the studies of the impact of immigration upon radicalisation often overlook 
is that it is male centric.  Female migrants do not feature prominently within terror 
groups in the West.  The lack of women in contemporary Muslim groups is all too 
easily explained by patriarchal, traditional families and communities.  Certainly there 
are elements of this.  Nevertheless for the ‘traditional’ to be a universal feature we 
would expect male British Muslim bombers to originate from such families.  This has 
often not been the case.  Moreover, as Speckhard (2008) explains, the experiences of 
first to third generation females differ from males, not only in the potential restrictions 
that are placed upon the behaviour of many women, limiting opportunities for 
radicalisation.  Unlike males, female migrants do not suffer the drop in status that 
many men experience on arrival.  In short, these women had already been awarded 
secondary status.  Speckhard (2008) argues that many girls are more flexible in their 
approach to learning and study harder at school than boys who struggle to adapt to the 
family’s drop in status.  As a consequence they are able to extend their knowledge and 
interests beyond de-territorial experiences and become more integrated into the host 
society.  Hence, unlike females who do not become radicalised because of their 
restricted enclosure within familial safeguards, the incorporation of some of the other 
women within societal employment, political and cultural spheres can diminish the 
likelihood of their radicalisation.   
 
The Political Solution: Freedom or Suppression 
 
Political arrangements can also be instrumental in radicalising layers of habitus. Shifts 
in balance between social and self restraints with greater emphasis upon the latter can 
create spaces for terrorism to emerge particularly within democracies.  There is a long 
standing belief that terrorism emerges when movements are denied other political 
forms of expression.  However Hafez (2003) and Rashid (2002) have identified a 
number of recent instances of the ‘successful’ repression of opposition in Algeria, 
Central Asia, Egypt, Syria and Tunisia.  In situations such as these personality 
structures are aligned with the dictatorial regimes and there is a greater willingness by 
individuals to accept orders and be guided by external constraints and hierarchies of 
constraint.  And if people do not obey they are quickly encouraged to adapt their 
personalities or are constrained by state forces of surveillance and correction (Elias 
1996).  Numerous historical instances of this can be drawn upon.  Anarchists in 
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Germany and Russia were largely eradicated through persecution, imprisonment and 
execution (Aydinli 2008, Bach Jensen 2004).  Thus these radical groups were 
suppressed.  However, the underlying processes that led to their formulation were not 
addressed.  Consequently systemic problems remained and anarchism was to be 
replaced by other powerful forms of radical discourse, namely communism, socialism 
and fascism.  
 
By comparison within some democratic arrangements, militant movements have 
become incorporated within mainstream society over generations and contribute to the 
internalisation of pacification.  In Woodcock’s (2004: 917) study of anarchism, he 
referred to the substantial levels of excitement and persecution.  As one Anarchist 
wrote, with respect to the lack of anarchist fervour in northern Europe, the few 
anarchists enjoyed ‘the prestige that in northern lands is granted to those voices crying 
in the wilderness, which form the conveniently externalized consciences of peoples 
largely devoted to the acquisition and enjoyment of material prosperity’.    
 
Nevertheless, democracy is not a universal panacea.  Terrorism occurs across a 
multitude of political arrangements including democracy (Gurr 1998 and Lutz and 
Lutz 2005).  For instance, terrorism has been prominent within functional 
democracies across Western Europe, North America, Japan and on occasion within 
some South and Central American states such as Guatemala, El Salvador and Chile.24  
Therefore, terrorism can be operational within countries where the state’s monopoly 
on violence is tenuous such as Colombia and Somalia, where it is all embracing like 
some of the above examples and perhaps more surprisingly to Western perceptions, in 
liberal democracies.  Under repressive regimes, challenges to governments are often 
curtailed within extensive apparatus of control.  Therefore as Elias (1996: 235) argues, 
‘human groups usually revolt against what they experience as oppression not when 
the oppression is at its strongest, but precisely when it begins to weaken’ which, in 
this instance, also accords with the political opportunity structure thesis. The actions 
of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Country and Freedom) or ETA are a case in point.  
Although ETA formed during the Franco dictatorship, their actions intensified as the 
Franco regime weakened.  With the transition to democracy, ‘it became more violent 
and more separatist. … Terrorism escalated just as democracy had indisputably 
established itself’ (Wieviorka 1997: 295).  Furthermore, migrants from authoritarian 
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regimes to liberal democracies have also reconstructed discursive consciousness and 
become more radical.  The most notable examples were the Hamburg cell that was 
instrumental in the September 2001 attacks on America.  They appear to have 
consciously decided to adopt political violence as a form of behaviour after arriving in 
Germany from more authoritarian regimes.   
 
Further distinctions within the spectrum of dominant political arrangements need to 
be drawn to accommodate groups such as the loyalists in Northern Ireland and Far 
Right in America.  Other groups may denounce oppression, injustice and police 
brutality but the reported incidents lack the extensive, pernicious nature of the 
constraints imposed upon preceding generations in Germany and Italy and 
contemporaneous Egypt, China and Russia.  At this point, there is a danger of 
apparent contradiction as all three countries have encountered terrorism25 and of the 
former two countries, Italy under Mussolini experienced episodes of terrorism, 
including attempts on Il Duce’s life. Consequently, I should stress that there is not a 
political system that can be guaranteed to incorporate potential radicalisation and 
prevent attacks of political violence.  As I explained earlier, the likelihood of this 
eventuality is heavily influenced by the duration that self-restraints have been 
internalised and levels of mutual interdependence, functional democratisation, 
stability and security.  Democratic institutions and accompanying civil liberties, 
security, pathways for consensus and compromise and self-controls must become 
developed and embedded within dispositions and behaviour before tensions can be 
contained within the democratic framework.  Therefore, in situations where 
authoritarian regimes are overthrown and replaced by democratic institutions there 
will be a lag between the new political structures and individual dispositions which 
are more attuned to formal processes of decision-making and visible forms of external 
constraint.26  For Elias (1996: 291) the long process of attunement in Britain has 
contributed to it being ‘one of the few countries in which, so far, a parliamentary state 
structure and an individual personality structure have become attuned to each other in 
a comparatively friction-free way.’27
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Conclusion 
 
In summary, just like other forms of behaviour political violence is part of individual 
and social dispositions.  And as with other forms of social behaviour, the forms did 
not emerge in a vacuum nor could the roots be unearthed within the soiled minds of 
crazed individuals.  Terrorism is learned, it relies upon communication, shared and 
competing norms and values and levels of social and self-restraints.  Processes of 
social control and interwoven forms of collective identification and functional 
democratisation were insufficiently developed or in some instances had become 
threateningly overdeveloped at the expense of the previously self declared dominant 
groups.  In other words processes of pacification are partial, incomplete or can be 
undermined. For terrorists this has meant that violence as a form of behaviour can be 
adopted because radical norms and values have proved more influential or the 
restraints they have internalised are not considered to apply within particular settings.  
In some instances violence has been encouraged by communities within these 
localities.  Nationalist struggles would be such an example.     
 
That pathways into terrorism so often emerge in places with histories of political 
violence, state sanctioned capital punishment or the cultural normalisation of 
aggressive behaviour is not coincidental.  As this chapter has shown, contemporary 
habitus in these locations contain violent sediment from the past or in other words 
dispositions are ‘soiled’ with aggressive ideas and forms of behaviour of history.  
Through the intergenerational transmission of narrative, mythology and symbols 
violence has been retained and is expressed as a form of political action during the 
intersection with particular conditions.  These include perceived threats to, 
insecurities of, and uncertainties within, the habitus which contribute to challenges to 
the opposing other.  The habitus therefore becomes both the source of protection and 
protectors.  In the following chapter, processes through which groups form and 
individuals join and thus become ‘protectors’ of habitus or intended creators of new 
forms of disposition are explored. 
 
There is a danger here that this emphasis upon dispositions could be read to imply that 
identifying the responsible habitus will enable counter terrorism to be more precisely 
targeted and ultimately victorious.  Or in other words, I have created the sociological 
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equivalent of the psychological profile.  I hasten to add that this is not the intention.  
Within the remainder of this book I reiterate, with almost repetitive regularity, that 
just as there is no single profile nor is there one habitus in which terrorism forms.  On 
the contrary, the multiple locations, ideas, emotions and forms of behaviour are 
indicative of distinct forms of habitus.  Such differences should not however preclude 
investigation.  The study of individual processes of radicalisation did not end with the 
realisation that Osama bin Laden and Leila Khaled have fundamentally different 
personalities.  Much can be learnt about individual pathways into terrorism.  Similarly, 
considerably more information can be obtained about the social figurations in which 
people’s journeys in and out of terrorism occur.  Consequently, in the following 
chapter the socialising agents that interweave the history and contemporary habitus 
and broader movements and terror groups are explored.  Through this exploration we 
can postulate the processes whereby people join and form groups.  
 
  
 
                                                 
1 Yet it would be a mistake to consider violence to permeate throughout all Somali interactions.  
Alongside a backdrop of southern state lawlessness, informal mechanisms and systems of governance 
have (re) emerged to varying degrees, imposing forms of regulation and achieving revised levels of 
security.  Security is most prominent in nomadic areas where traditional regulatory arrangements and 
structures have been less adversely affected by colonialism and subsequent Somali governments.  
Radical Islamic groups are also providing forms of constraint (Menkhaus 2003, 2004, Møller 2009, 
Vertigans 2010).    
2 I am arguing that habits are a component of habitus, the two are not synonymous.   
3 Elias’ application also has components that could be refined.  First Van Krieken (1998) notes the 
inconsistency in which the durability of habitus in changing social conditions is discussed.  In 
particular, he asks would a different habitus rapidly follow on from social transformations or would 
there be a possible ‘lag’ whereby the social changes moved ahead of the psychological structure?  
Second Crossley’s (2003) observation that Bourdieu tends to neglect wider preconditions for protest 
and movement formation such as political opportunities, resources and mobilisation networks can also 
be applied to Elias.  Third, in comparison to Bourdieu, Elias tends to be vague regarding the mechanics 
of habitus, indeed arguably he generally under utilised the concept. For instance, the processes through 
which agents were provided with practical consciousness that is integral for social reproduction are 
underdeveloped.  By comparison Bourdieu details how individuals experience habitus 
phenomenologically as ‘second nature’ (Thorpe 2010).  Nevertheless Elias’ less mechanical and more 
fluid approach allows for different layers within national and transnational consciousness that both 
integrate and detach terrorists from broader social relations which Bourdieu’s greater emphasis upon 
the socio-economic location hinders.   
4 With this observation Bourdieu seems to be at least implicitly undermining Crossley’s (2003) critical 
remark that he neglects the possibility of habitus falling out of alignment.   
5 Substantial funding from within the kingdom has been, and continues to be, received by radical 
Islamic groups within Afghanistan.  
6 Cited in Allen (2006: 235). 
7 Degregori (1997) traces the rejection of the West and the appropriation of Western instruments of 
domination to the sixteenth century.  
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8 Almana (1982: 241) declares that in establishing the modern judicial framework, King Ibn Saud 
referred to the saying of the Prophet Muhammed that ‘harsh punishments are often necessary for the 
protection of the innocent’.  Forceful remedies were to be the solution to lawlessness. 
9 Hewitt (2003) details the range of groups that have undertaken terror attacks in America.  These 
include white and black racists, Islamic militants, communists, neo-Nazis, militant Jews, anti-
abortionists and Puerto Rican secessionists.  
10 There are also grounds for supposition that the gun has quickly attained tremendous symbolism 
within black ‘ghetto’ culture but for more contemporary factors such as popular culture, diminished 
opportunities and shifting social and self restraints (Wacquant 2004). 
11 Further details can be found in Mennell 2007, Nisbett and Cohen 1996, Wyatt-Brown 1982. 
12 The roots for white supremacy can be located within the culture of the early European settlers and 
given legal emphasis through legislation such as the Naturalization Act, 1790.  The Act included within 
the criteria for citizenship the requirement for being white and which contributed towards a racial 
character within reformulated nationalism (Johnson and Frombgen 2009). 
13 Mennell (2007) describe the extent of the support.  Such was the backlash against the possible 
abolition that politicians formed policy to accord with the vocal, vociferous opposition.  
14 There are a number of factors which can help to explain the limited focus on Saudi targets including 
the longevity and charisma of the Saud ruling family, relative wealth, cooptation and rehabilitation of  
rivals and militants, incorporation of religious leaders, traditional familial relations and tribal 
crosscutting loyalties which weaken other alliances.  Hegghammer (2009) details how the militants’ 
initial emphasis was on the ‘Crusaders’ and the government through its security services only became 
targeted when they were seen to be intervening on behalf of the West.  For groups associated with al-
Qa’ida this may be part of a two-stage approach namely to mobilise the population against the 
crusaders before overthrowing the regime.   
15 Collins is cited in Kiberd (1992: 231).   
16 For instance none of their respondents proudly acknowledged their son or daughter to be a martyr.  
This is in marked contrast to the territories where Palestinian expressions of pride and even 
‘celebrations’ have been well-documented. 
17 These sentiments can be found within publications across the Far Right.  Eric Rudolph (2005), an 
anti-abortion bomber, provides an illustrative reflection upon the immorality of abortion which he 
connects to other forms of immorality. ‘Thousands of years of moral progress were sacrificed upon the 
altar of selfishness and materialism.  A new barbarism, a culture of death has now taken root in 
America’.  The act of abortion is ‘the vomitorium of modernity helping the hedonistic partiers disgorge 
the unwanted consequences of their sexual license’.   
18 A similar correlation can be made between Reagan’s approach to abortion and associated violence.   
Blanchard and Prewitt (1993) point to the more aggressive stance against family planning and abortion 
by the Reagan administration compared to the previous Carter government.  Anti-abortion violence 
dramatically increased.  For the authors this was evidence that Reagan was considered to tacitly 
approve the tactics.  However Hewitt (2003) challenges the data and argues that the violence remained 
after Reagan’s departure and even increased.  Moreover the murders committed by anti-abortionists 
were during Clinton’s Presidency, who was much more pro-choice.  Despite appearing contradictory, it 
is conceivable that both explanations offer important insights.  Reagan did contribute towards a more 
politicised form of anti-abortionism and supporters could easily have mis/understood his actions and 
rhetorics to be complicitly supportive.  By comparison, under Clinton, conservative morality was felt to 
be threatened and some of the abortion restrictions imposed under Reagan and George Bush were lifted 
which anti-abortionists viewed as threatening to their beliefs.    
19 The perceived threat from the nearest theological rival partly helps to explains the brutality of attacks 
against Sh’ites by militants.  For Devji (2005) the growing similarity between radical Sunnis and 
Shi’ites and competition over ideas and behaviour is contributing to more indiscriminate attacks by the 
former on the latter.   
20 General Zia ul Haq governed from 1977 until his death in 1988.  
21 Parallels can be drawn with the surge of lynching that occurred in the southern states following the 
civil war and fears of greater black political and economic participation (Lane 1997, Mennell 2007).   
For Mennell (2007: 147) the decline of lynching and vigilantism (discussed in previous chapter) is 
indicative of ‘the taming of warriors’ that signified the extension and greater efficiency of state 
monopoly of violence and greater trust of the government.  Arguably the former is proving more 
effective in restraining the Far Right than feelings of trust which are seriously lacking. 
22 Nevertheless despite the younger spread of members, it is important to acknowledge that 
membership of terror groups is not necessarily ‘ageist.’  A cursory glance at the leadership of leading 
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terror groups such as al-Qa’ida, Aum Supreme Truth and IRA indicate that experience is also highly 
regarded at senior levels.  And while Elias develops upon the youth of the West German Red Army 
Faction he fails to acknowledge that both Horst Mahler and Ulrike Meinhof were well into their 30s 
when they became involved. 
23 Akbar mentions that the jihad was against Richard II but his rule was two hundred years later. 
24 The perpetrators of terrorism within Guatamala and Chile have been somewhat different.  Levenson 
(2003) points out with regards to the former that 93 per cent of the acts of violence and terror that 
resulted in the deaths of 200,000 between 1962 and 1996 were attributed to the state.  At the time, the 
political system was nominally based upon the Western democratic model.  Similarly Chile under 
Pinochet reacted during periods of fear over a potential coup within spiralling levels of hatred and 
insecurity and persecuted and assassinated opposition groups and personnel (Zárate 2003). 
25 Egypt has regularly encountered terrorism.  The most prominent surge in radicalisation arguably 
occurred when President Sadat lessened social restraints upon political activism.  After failing to 
deliver promises that contributed to opposition being further radicalised, he was assassinated by 
militants who had formed and acted within the looser frameworks of restraint.  Both China and Russia 
have largely encountered secessionist groups that share considerable similarities with other struggles 
for independence.  
26 An observation that appeared to have bypassed the American administration whose perception that 
democracy would be the panacea to problems within the Middle East generally and Iraq in particular 
has been proved to be fatally naïve.   
27 For anyone wondering about the extent to which the situation in Northern Ireland contradicts this 
statement, the short answer is that it does not.  Northern Ireland is not part of Britain (it is part of the 
UK) and the island’s colonial status meant that it was not part of the longer term processes of 
attunement.  Moreover, following partition subsequent levels of established security and mutual 
interdependence have remained low which has prevented closer alignment between parliamentary and 
personality structures. 
